The Communist Party of Ireland
A Critical History, Part 3 by DR O'Connor Lysaght, 1976

The organisational division of Irish Stalinism along the lines of the border coupled with its liquidation in the 26 Counties, seems to have been (indeed it must have been even for the Stalinites) designed as a temporary measure to be reversed at the end of the Second World War.

In fact, reunification was not to be so easy. Having subjected its own revolutionary perspectives to the hypothesis of 'Socialism in a single Country', the two Stalinite groups discovered themselves reacting increasingly according to their immediate local situations in direct contradiction to each other. The split itself had been designed originally to help the Anglo-Russian war effort (or, more particularly, to be seen to do so) and the protection of Stalin's 'Socialist Society'. Now this surrender to the immediate conjunctural needs weakened resistance to future surrenders that would be less favourable to the needs of the Russian Bureaucracy. Certainly, this interest would, after 1945, have benefited more by a revived thirty-two county party than by what it actually found: a six county Party and a 26 county 'League'.

A major contributory factor in the weakness was the fact that, from 1943, the instrument by which the Russian bureaucracy enforced conformity existed bo longer. How far the Comintern had functioned from 1939 onwards (indeed, how fat the CPI's liquidation in 1941 was the result of a direct order from Moscow) is uncertain. What is definite is that, in 1943, as a new concession to his imperialist allies, Stalin sent the Comintern the way of its Irish section. It was revived in fact after the war but was, outside the new workers' states, a shadow of its predecessor. Organisationally, the Irish Stalinite groups would tend, in the revived third International to act as a satellite of the british organisation which was, in turn, in that body, subordinate to its French comrades. It was not until 1957, that Irish delegates attended an international conference at Moscow, the first time Ireland had been represented there since 1935.

But this result, if it was to affect, negatively, Irish Stalinism after 1948 was itself helped to reach its goal by its own internal development after the 1941 split. This history can be summarised as one of uneven political development: a major difference between organisational expansion on the one hand and organisational liquidation leading to political disintegration on the other.

The Communist Party of Northern Ireland
The keynote of the wartime policy of the rump Communist Party of Northern Ireland was set by its Manifesto on 4 October 1941:

'A victory for the Soviet Union and its allies among the enslaved nations of the Continent, including Germany and the Anglo-American peoples, would be a triumph for the cause of national liberty everywhere and would advance the movement for Ireland's complete freedom.

'Let no section of Irish opinion be deceived into harbouring any other ideas. The cause of Irish freedom stands or fails with the cause of the Soviet Union and the world forces of Labour and Democracy allied with it.'

Thus the remaining organised expression of Irish Stalinism was prepared to consign the Irish revolution to cold storage until such time as 'the Soviet Union and its Allies' could win the war. However it remained in being in the six counties as it did not in the twenty-six. In Northern Ireland, the larger proportion of the total working-class was readily accessible to the claims, if not so much of Russia, or of Socialism, than of the 'Anglo-American people'. The newly-reconstituted Communist Party of Northern Ireland had an obvious base on which to build both its own interests and those of the Russian war-effort.

But there were two snags in this perspective. In the first place, the workers to whom the CPNI now directed its appeal were precisely those who were prepared to sympathise with the USSR only as long as its positive social achievements were not related concretely to the situation in Northern Ireland. In other words, the appeal of Russia to the Protestant majority in Northern Irish workers was mainly in so far as it was an ally of British Imperialism. Of course, it was, somehow, a 'working-class' ally and, as such, perhaps a pleasanter friend for a Protestant workers than the USA. Nevertheless, the bulk of his support was for the imperialist war waged by the United Kingdom rather than the 'Anti-Fascist War' that the CPNI was concerned to claim was being fought by the Soviet Union.

Whether or not this attitude would have been amended by the Northern Irish Stalinites is, itself, dubious. The British imperialism that the Protestant workers defended was, for them, defensible, precisely because it maintained guardianship of an essentially undemocratic – and, hence, unsocialist colonial state which had been created so as to guarantee certain real but, in comparison with the possibilities infinitesimal rights to a religiously defined majority of the people. While, under the condition of partition, it is conceivable that a violently repressive regime could enforce a measure of negative equality as between the communities, such a move would be against its own interest (that of 'divide and rule') and unlikely to last if the repression ended without the end of partition. It was not really possible to lay the foundations for a lasting workers' state in Northern Ireland, without either abolishing partition or creating the revolutionary momentum that would destroy partition. From 1941 to 1970, the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, despite all its triumphs – at least in the early part of this period – represented a movement that had organisationally renounced such a strategy. The 'needs of the Soviet Union' (more correctly the limited needs of the ruling bureaucracy thereof; its objective need was still for a working-class revolution worldwide) seemed to fuse extraordinarily well with an opportunistic desire to adapt to Orangeism. To the pressure provided by the first (objective) snag was added a force created by a second (subjective) one. The leadership of the CPNI was merely the Northern Irish part of those who had led the united CPI in the days of the Republican Congress and 'Republican-Labour Unity'. For such people, there could be no principled hesitancy, no analysis of the class relations affecting and affected by partition, only total commitment to the short term aim of Allied victory at any cost.

Their war-time programme was set out in their Party's Conference in October 1942:

'1. For the reconstruction of the Stormont Government [that is, the inclusion of Labour representatives therein];

'2. A Coalition Government – including representatives of the 3 major political parties in the 26 Counties [A demand only supported by Fine Gael of these political parties themselves.];

'3. Maximum production of all essential materials;

'4. Unity of the Labour Movement;

'5. For the Second Front.'

It backed these demands with such denunciations as the following:

'To us the demand for the resignation of the (Unionist) Government in the present serious position, which demands the greatest possible unity of the people is sheer opportunism . . .

'Today, when the forces of democracy, with the glorious Soviet Union as their spearhead, require the greatest possible production of materials necessary for the prosecution of the war against Fascism, every hour lost in the factories, workshops and shipyards, is an hour gained by the enemy. A strike, no matter under what circumstances it takes place, cannot be supported by our Party.'

(All quotes from Ireland's Way Forward, Report of the Conference of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, October 1942).

After this, it was already overdue for the CPNI to recognise formally the Northern Irish State, which it did in 1943.

Once again, Irish – or at least, Northern Irish – Stalinism found itself tail-ending HC Midgeley who had now broken with the NILP and formed his own 'Commonwealth Labour Party' pledged to accept partition. Midgeley's change enabled him to enter a 'reconstructed' Unionist ministry under Brooke in 1943. To this move the CPNI could only protest in vain that less pliant Labour representatives should have been recruited as well. It was ignored.

Nonetheless, Northern Irish Stalinism benefited organisationally from its support for the Second World War. Its opposition (practical as well as theoretical) to all strikes tended to strengthen it since few strikes were successful. At one time, with nearly 2000 members it was even able to claim a larger membership than the NILP, which, with the departure of Midgeley, had begun a period of relative leftism and anti-partitionism. Its weekly papers that succeeded Irish Workers' Weekly (banned in the Six Counties), The Red Hand and Unity gained a wide readership.

But this success was qualified. It was essentially organisational rather than political, and it was based entirely on the Protestant workers who were encouraged to look to the CPNI as more radical types of Labour Unionists than Midgeley or the Minister for Health, William Grant. It would be wrong to ignore that its strength in the industrial organisations of this group has helped towards a moderating effect on traditional working class Orange bigotry at least on the factory floor. Nonetheless, the greater political unity of the Northern Irish – let alone Irish – working-class was not advanced by Stalinite policy. While the CPNI wooed the Orange workers, their Catholic peers moved from Fianna Fáil sponsored 'Republicanism' to Harry Diamond's Republican Socialist group, or, even, towards the NILP.

In June 1945 occurred the first general election for the Northern Irish Parliament since 1938. The Communist Party nominated three candidates: William McCullough in the Bloomfield division of Belfast, Betty Sinclair in the Cromac division and Sylvester Maitland in West Down. All these constituencies returned Unionist MPs throughout their existence. But they were not all homogeneous; thus Cromac included a large Nationalist minority in the Markets area.

The Party's election Manifesto was entitled 'Let's Build a New Ulster'. It contained a 5 Point Programme of minimum demands:

1. Government control of industry, prices rents and monopolies; full employment and fair distribution of the nation's resources;

2. Social equality with Britain; free education (primary to university); increased unemployment and sickness allowances; more generous treatment of the old, disabled, blind and widowed; family allowance of 8/- [€0.50] per week per child;

3. Firm alliance of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union, firm alliance of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom, friendly relations with 'Éire' and 'the winning of the whole country to the camp of the democratic nations'.

4. Democratic reform, including electoral reform in Northern Ireland;

6. Increased pensions and allowances for members and dependents of the armed forces, immediate absorption of the ex-Servicemen into industry and civilian life by the provision of jobs and houses.

In this, two characteristics are obvious. The first is the, now commonplace adherence to minimum demands (thus, the chief economic panacea is, once again, 'control' not 'nationalisation').

The second characteristic is the programme's stand – or, rather, non-stand – on partition. It seems to be in favour of the border but it phrases its support in such a way ('alliance' with [not even within] the UK and 'friendly relations' with 'Éire') that this can be denied formally.

The same careful blurring of issues extended into the actual tactics of the Party's election campaign. In Cromac, Betty Sinclair's election posters did not mention that the lady was a 'red'. And there was a possibly unintentional confusion in that her Unionist opponent was also called Sinclair.

Because of these tactics, or despite them, the three Communist Party candidates won, between them, 12,456 votes – 3.5% of the total poll. This was nearly 12 times the percentage of votes that would be won by candidates of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the United Kingdom general election the following month. It appeared that the Protestant workers of Northern Ireland were awakened to class-consciousness in the vanguard of the workers of the British Isles.

But before this can be accepted to-day it is necessary to note two differences in the circumstances of the two general elections. To compare the two parties overall share of the votes is misleading since it ignores other figures. In the first place, whereas the CPNI fought three seats out of 28 contested, the CPGB fought only 20 out of some 640 (615 if the university and Northern Irish seats are eliminated). It is, perhaps, fairer to judge the performances by the constituency averages of the two parties – bearing in mind that the Northern Irish single-seat constituencies were 29-33% the size of those in Britain. So we find that the average vote per Northern Irish constituency for each Communist Party [candidate] is 4,152 (12,456 on the British scale). The equivalent average vote for the British Communists is 5,155. Thus, in 1945, the CPNI enjoyed and electoral support of, on average, 2.5 times that enjoyed by their British comrades. But here again, a second constitutional consideration must be introduced. All the Northern Irish Communists opposed the Unionists in straight fights; that is to say, in their three constituencies, anyone who did not wish to vote Unionist could choose only between voting Communist and not voting at all. The British Communists were less fortunate; they all had to oppose Labour and Conservative candidates and often, others, as well.

None of this is to deny the impressive nature of the electoral achievement of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland in 1945. A large vote for a Communist candidate is always admirable, particularly in Ireland. The point is that this achievement and the result has been a major historical distortion which had been used by opponents of the exploited and oppressed.

The 1945 election results were the highest political achievement resulting from the CPNI's support for partition. From then on it's wartime decision to restrict it's actions to the Six Counties would show diminishing returns – indeed losses.

The most important of these was now to be shown in the Party's inability to regroup itself as a 32 County organisation. The war ended finally in September 1945. The split between the Soviet Union and it's 'democratic allies' was soon underway. Even in the short term the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy required a united Communist Party of Ireland, if only for it's nuisance value to British imperialism. Yet the CPI was not reformed for a quarter of a century after 1945. It's failure to reconstitute itself immediately was due to three things: the fact of the dissolution of the Comintern and the weakening of direct organisational links between Moscow and Ireland, the fact that the CPNI feared to sacrifice it's new base among the Protestant workers and the fact that 26 County Stalinism was in no position to take on the tasks of participating in even a bureaucratically distorted Communist Party.

Twenty-Six County Stalinism
When the Stalinites in 'Éire' liquidated their organisation into the Irish Labour Party in July 1941 they did so merely to find a safe billet from which they could agitate in support of Socialism in general and Soviet Russia in particular for the duration of the war. They had no definite perspective for an eventual split. For a few months they tried to maintain the Workers' Weekly but constant censorship forced them to end it in November 1941. It was succeeded by The Red Hand, a paper geared to the needs of the CPNI. They didn't even do work in support of their northern comrades' call for a Coalition Government. They merely maintained a dubious unity around the theoretical journal, Review, fought the Dublin Trotskyists with a certain amount of success (helped by the USSR's current struggle), and gained influence over their paper, The Torch.

This was all they could do given their non-existent perspectives. It did not provide a firm opposition to pressures encouraging it's members' political surrender to Social Democracy. In particular, there were the local election victories of 1942. In this year, Breen was elected to the Dublin City Council in a Labour landslide. In 1943, Larkin was returned to the Dáil. Both these achievements increased the pressures on the individuals concerned to break with their old politics. This was exposed by the latter victory, coupled with 'Big Jim's' victory in North East Dublin.

The 1942 Municipal elections had been won after the Larkinites – as well as the Stalinites – had rejoined the Labour Party. This was not welcomed by William O'Brien and the bureaucracy of the ITGWU. Their supporters tried to block the Larkinites' nominations for candidacies in the coming general election. In the resulting period of infighting, one member of the Party's Administrative Council, Owen Sheehy-Skeffington, was expelled. But, eventually, 'Young Jim' was returned as an official Labour TD for South Dublin and his father was elected as an Independent, applied for the Party whip and was given it despite opposition from the ITGWU Deputies.

This was the cause of the split in the Labour Party and the Irish TUC that now ensued. The initial matter at stake was simply whether Norton or O'Brien should run the Party. The Communist scare raised by the latter the better to fight the Larkins was merely an excuse for so doing. That this was so was shown by two facts. The ex-Christian Frontist, Keyes, and the scarcely less clericalist, William Davin, stood with Norton in this issue. Furthermore, Norton himself, who had revealed his susceptibility to red scares before and would do so again (over the Mother and Child Scheme) did not retreat before the ITGWU – at least, not as far as might have been expected. The Larkins remained Labour Deputies, although most of the ITGWU members in Dáil Éireann seceded to form a 'National Labour Party'.

But if Norton showed a greater determination in facing the scare put around by the ITGWU fakirs than he did similar scares manufactured by men in dog collars, he still bent further than a Socialist might have done. The Larkins were saved from expulsion: they were sitting TDs. Breen and the Larkinite, Bernard Conway were city councillors. Seán Dolan was not such a loss to the Party's representation on public bodies. In January 1944, he and three other rank and file members were expelled. Some months later, Larkin spoke out. In the letter to Norton, he declared:

'I emphatically declare that I am not a member of the Communist Party and was not for some years before I joined the Labour Party.'

For the rest of his life he was to act in the spirit of this statement.

The Stalinites who remained as such were barely happier. None of Nolan's fellow-expellees were to become prominent in the mainstream Stalinite movement of the next thirty years, though one, John deCourcey Ireland, who appealed successfully against his expulsion, has gained a certain political niche as Ireland's only Titoite. Despite some new recruitment stimulated by continuing Russian victories, the Review group was smaller in 1945 than it had been when it entered the Labour Party.

This numerical decline in Stalinite members in 'Éire' was partially repaired by a certain number of recruits it won from the persecuted Republican Movement. In particular, there was a hard core of potential cadres educated in the Curragh by Neil Goold during a stay there which was cut short when the clergy was told what he was doing. The most notable of Goold's converts was the International Brigade veteran, Michael O'Riordan. But, by the end of the war, neither he nor his fellow recruits to Stalinism had merged with what would become the Review group. Instead, on his release, he first tried to work within the Labour Party, was expelled, and then started a Socialist group in his native Cork.

It was this group that took the first major step towards reviving Stalinism's fortunes in 'Éire'. In 1945 O'Riordan was narrowly defeated for a seat on Cork Corporation. In June 1946 he fought a bye-election in Cork City. He won 3,184 first preference votes (the largest total votes he's polled yet) – nearly 11% of those cast. As a comparative result, it has more in common with the Northern Irish election returns that with those of the British general election, despite the discrepancy in size between the Cork City constituency and those of Northern Ireland. No Labour candidate fought the seat – though O'Riordan beat the formidable Republican, Thomas Barry, into fourth place. Although, perhaps not a striking as the CPNI results in Belfast and in West Down, it was quite a satisfactory achievement for a group that had existed only for a short time and which was already feeling the draught of the Cold War that would be waged enthusiastically by the Catholic hierarchy.

TA Jackson and Irish Stalinism
Despite the obvious potentiality that existed for the revival of the Communist Party organisation in 'Éire', the CPNI did little to expand thither. It was more than two years after O'Riordan's campaign that a distinctive Stalinite political grouping established itself, at last, in the 26 Counties. It's theory owed more to a member of the CPGB than to the CPNI.

The British Stalinite who provided the political ideology behind the reorganisation of Stalinism in the 26 Counties of 'Éire' was Thomas Alfred Jackson, for many years the CPGB's expert on Ireland (among other things). Jackson was a veteran British Socialist who had long maintained an honest opposition to British imperialism and its expansion. He had been moved to radicalism by boyhood admiration for Parnell: he developed into Second International Marxism out of opposition to the British aggression against the Boers. He was never fooled – as many Social Democrats (following the Fabian Society) were fooled – by the undeveloped, petty bourgeois, political nature of many anti-colonial movements (so different from the Socialist ideals of Ramsay MacDonald and Sidney Webb!) However he tended to go too far in the other direction.

The right to self-determination has been granted by the colonial power to it's oppressed subjects because colonialism weakens politically the Socialist movement both in the colony and in the coloniser. In both, it stimulates the emotional political outlook known as 'Nationalism'. In the metropolitan power, this is a wholly reactionary force acting as an ideological excuse for imperialist war, or at the very least, creating a narrow, chauvinist, conservative class-collaborationist prejudice, among all classes – and in particular, the workers. In the colony, Nationalism's obnoxiousness is more subtle precisely because here Revolutionary Marxists often have to fight for the same aims (national self-determination, etc) as the Nationalists. Nonetheless, Marxists have to maintain their political independence of the Nationalists and, indeed, criticise their weaknesses, since Nationalist politics – their very real emphasis on the primacy of the nation as against any international class (even the working class) – oppose the aims of the world proletarian revolution and weaken the effectiveness, at times even of the struggle for the limited aims of national self-determination. Accordingly support for a colony's right to self-determination is independent of the character of the leadership that will exercise this right. In this way, Lenin recognised and accepted the right of the Finns to independence of the USSR, even though this right was executed, initially, by the reactionary militarist Gustave Manneheim. The right of the Ugandans to self-determination is not compromised by a brute like Idi Amin, any more than that of the Libyans is compromised by the sexist, Qadafy, or that, indeed, of the Irish by the peculiar hacks that have ruled the 26 Counties since the proclamation of the Dáil.

Evasion of this truth has tended to encourage – and in turn be encouraged by – the Stalinist dogma of the stages of revolution, with it's emphasis on the progressive, independent role, even of such as Chiang Kai-Shek. In TA Jackson, this process is expressed in a case-history. His essentially romantic anti-colonialism was expressed as early as 1921, when he anticipated that the irish Republican Brotherhood would lead the opposition to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Of course, it did no such thing, anti-Treaty forces were led by other, only nationalistic groupings. But the point is the IRB was the established Republican leadership of the time. Instead of analysing the class forces in detail, Jackson allowed himself the luxury of glorifying petty-bourgeois nationalists. It is not surprising that he was to prove to be one of the most bitter Stalinites in the next three decades; nor that his weakness was highlighted in the book he had published in 1947.

Had Ireland Her Own been simply what its author claimed, his debility would have been less important. In his foreword he declares:

'In this book I try to tell the story, first of how Ireland became to be part of the British Empire, then of how the Irish people struggle to undo that conquest and so regain the possession of the soil and sovereign rule of Ireland.

'The reason for telling this story is that, contrary to common belief, the process is not yet complete. I have thought it necessary to show the causes of the Anglo-Irish conflict, since only when these are known will the common people of England, the final arbiters, (sic) be able to tackle this long-outstanding Irish Question with a comprehension of the real issues involved.

'The most valuable parts of this book should be those which show with what anxiety and diligence the rulers of England have had to labour to avoid being caught in a "pincer attack" between two distinct but converging emancipation struggles – those of the English and of the Irish common people respectively. The relations between the English rulers and the Irish rulers have been, throughout imperialist relations, consequently, the history of the 800 years of Anglo-Irish conflict – with the examples of every variety of imperialist aggression and of every form of resistance thereto – supplies an invaluable introduction to the critical study of Imperialism in general.

'The writings of Englishmen upon Anglo-Irish relations only too often call to mind an often-quoted remark by the Earl of Essex to Queen Elizabeth: "'Twere well for our credit that we had the exposition of our quarrel with these people and not they themselves."

'Irish writers upon the subject have commonly been satisfied with destroying such shreds of credit the English expounders of the quarrel have contrived to save. Thus they have, usually, missed the real tragedy involved in Ireland's history – the manner in which the English and Irish common people, each of them struggling for freedom, have been time and again jockeyed into becoming weapons used by the exploiters, each for the enslavement of the other.

'The outstanding exception is James Connolly, whose work Labour in Irish History is a work of genius. This work I have taken as my guide; but Connolly, writing as an Irishman for Irishmen, could suppose that his readers knew many things which are not all well known to the ordinary Englishman. I, who write as an Englishman, primarily for Englishmen, have to explain these things, as well as to continue the narrative beyond the point at which Connolly left off. If I have succeeded in what I have tried to do, my outline will provide English readers with a study of Connolly's work, and that of other specialist writers on Irish History. It will, at the same time, provide Irish readers with an introduction to the history of the English democratic and labour struggle.'

Ireland Her Own, pp.18-19, Seven Seas Books, Berlin 1973.

The confused assumptions in this passage are very obvious. Basically, they are aspects of the overall petty-bourgeois limitations that prevents Ireland Her Own ever reaching the level of Connolly's Labour in Irish History. A man who can describe Anglo-Irish relations as being, 'throughout, imperialist relations' during the 800 years is guilty, at the very least of confusing two concepts: the traditional and Leninist views of 'Imperialism'. Again, the failure of the Irish and English peoples to achieve freedom and their being instead 'jockeyed into being weapons used by the exploiters each for the enslavement of the other', has as much historical inevitability as tragedy about it. In the same way, Connolly's Labour in Irish History may or may not be 'a work of genius'. Its real value is infinitely greater than such an overused cliché. It is important because it is a work of original Marxist research. In the British Isles 'works of genius' may not be two a penny; actual Marxist achievements are still rarer at any price.

Again it must be insisted; these defects would not have had their decisive importance in Irish Stalinite thinking had the book been simply a propaganda exercise; had it simply continued the Irish historical 'narrative beyond the point at which Connolly left off', provided 'English readers with an introduction to the study of Connolly's work, and that of other specialist writers on Irish history' and provided 'Irish readers with an introduction to the history of the English democratic and labour struggle'. In fact Jackson provides both more and less than all this total of useful aims.

On the one hand, there is some extremely detailed and useful research expressed in the parts describing the Irish land system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This certainly gives Ireland Her Own a position of academic value in a sphere barely touched by Connolly's work.

The weakness comes in Jackson's political handling of his material. When he doesn't have Connolly to keep him on the straight and narrow path of Marxism, his work suffers. Thus he is never as good after the Fenian revolt (where Connolly's history ends) as he is before it. Connolly's narrative has had to await another historian to be adequately continued. The reason for this is the same one that prevents Jackson from providing the English with an adequate introduction to Connolly and for doing the same for the irish with regard to 'the English democratic and labour struggle'. In the one field he romanticises the bourgeois nationalists: in the other, he ignores the betrayals of the British labour fakirs. In the face not only of Connolly but of Karl Marx, he makes only a timid criticism of Grattan; elevating him by comparing him with Flood. He can only attack O'Connell for his inaction in and after 1842. Above all, his childhood admiration for Parnell is never reconsidered: the Parliamentary Nationalist leader is given a 'puff' that his actual role cannot sustain; an entire chapter is devoted to his fall. On the British front, though the Labour leaders cannot be whitewashed in the same manner, their chauvinist approach to the Irish question is simply ignored. The question between them and Larkin over the 1913 lock-out (simply the question; was there to be a British sympathetic general strike?) is carefully camouflaged by praise for the British trade unionists fund-raising for the ITGWU. The current and later opposition of JH Thomas to the cause of irish self-determination is ignored. Most significantly, it is possible to read Jackson's account of 1916 without discovering that the Secretary of the British Labour Party, Arthur Henderson, was in the actual War Cabinet that signed Connolly's death warrant. A little less space for the eighteenth century land tenures and a little more in exposing the real darkness of bourgeois nationalists and petty-bourgeois Labour bureaucrats would have improved Ireland Her Own immeasurably. It is not too much to say that the failure to do this arises out of Jackson's own romanticist weakness as preserved by the opportunist compromises demanded by Stalinism.

Jackson's ultimate failure appears in his consideration of the remaining task of the Irish bourgeois revolution: the reunification of the country; the ending of partition. (Although his work was published before the formal declaration of the Republic of Ireland, he ignores this aim, regarding it, correctly, as a non-event that could be accomplished easily enough.) Jackson concentrates, naturally, on the British share of responsibility for partition. The trouble is that he doesn't really explain it. In the end, he is reduced to an assertion:

'That Partition is an evil – that it was inflicted upon Ireland expressly to thwart the national aspirations of the Irish people – we have abundantly proved (sic). Forced to abandon the Act of Union – and 'Protestant Ascendancy' – the ruling class of England retorted by re-establishing the Pale in a new geographic location.'

Ibid, p.431.

This is a gross over-simplification. Partition was not established as essential to British imperialism's control of Ireland – though it had made matters easier for it. In fact, even by 1947, it was clear that the chief reason for British capitalism's support for partition was the negative fact that the status quo would be imperilled if 1,000,000 'Loyalists' had their aspirations discouraged and were left to the tender mercies of the Republican majority of the irish. The real argument for partition is – as it has always been – the purely conservative one of the need to keep things quiet. The chief argument against it – always after the duty of the metropolitan power to recognise its client's right to self-determination – is that its ending can help to stop this quiescence. Again, Jackson – ably aided by the practice of his party – turns the facts upside-down:

'Partition has established vested interests, on either side of its dividing line. It is reinforced on either side by a mass of inculcated prejudices. Because of that it is not possible to end Partition in a merely formal fashion by a simple repeal of the laws which instituted 'Northern Ireland'. It must be ended by the common agreement of all parties concerned – the Common People of the Six Counties, the Twenty-Six, and in England.'

Ibid, p.432.

Backed by a great mass of historical research, which has made Ireland Her Own a large and more complete study of the 'Irish Question' than anything Irish Stalinism has been able to produce, this conclusion gave the book the status of Irish Stalinism's central ideological inspiration. All mainstream (CPI) Stalinite theory on Ireland since 1947 has been based on Jackson's history and his conclusions. Much that seems – and, indeed, is – mistaken in the CPI's historical positions – their glorification of Parnell, for example, and their insistence that partition was established only by British guile – both of which are easily disproved – date back at least as far as Jackson, though, as has been seen, he merely codified Irish Stalinite practice. More relevant to the present situation is the method pursued currently by the CPI in relation to partition: the centring of the anti-partition agitation on the hope of a Northern Irish 'Bill of Rights' certainly fulfills Jackson's insistence on the need to work to end partition without too rude a disturbance in existing conditions. It is not surprising that, in 1971 when Ireland Her Own was about to be republished in paperback with an Epilogue by the ubiquitous Desmond Greaves, both Seán Nolan and Michael O'Riordan should go out of their way to advertise this fact.

More immediately, Irish Stalinism now had a conscious justification for a strategy that would enable it to exist – perhaps, even, to grow. It could now assert the need for a united 32 County Workers' Republic. At the same time, it had to respect 'vested interests' such as might be held to include the CPNI's base in the Protestant working-class.

Founding of the Irish Workers' League
So the Stalinites in 'Éire' prepared to organise alone. They might have taken longer, had they not been stimulated by the action of the divided and demoralised Labour Party in blundering finally into coalition with Fine Gael in February 1948. Many rank-and-file members in Dublin of Norton's party were disillusioned with it and moved towards the Review. Partly because of the opportunity, partly because of the necessity, this group turned from a predominantly propagandistic role to one of political activism. In October 1948, it held the founding conference of the Irish Workers' League. Though the new body did not immediately recruit O'Riordan and his supporters, they entered later. Seán Nolan became Chairman of the new League and the Irish Workers' Voice was revived as a duplicated weekly.

The Cold War Crisis in Ireland
Both the IWL and the CPNI faced the pressures brought upon Communists – of all groupings – everywhere by the Cold War. This created immediate pressures on each of the Irish Stalinite groupings that made it difficult for them to come to any agreement to reunify – both through day-to-day attacks by religious and other anti-Communist zealots and through political decisions made by the Governments of the two Irish states and affecting their overall environment.

The outstanding one of such decisions was, however, not made directly in relation to the Cold War – though, inevitably, it got involved in it. From August 1948, the policy of the new Inter-Party Government was openly to withdraw the twenty-six county state from the British Commonwealth. This was coupled, somewhat ingenuously, with the pious hope that, somehow, it would help to end partition. The Unionists took the opportunity to expose this illusion for what it was, and, incidentally, to eliminate those of their opponents who had been elected to Stormont in 1945; they called a general election in February 1949.

This 'partition' election did all that it was intended to do. The Labour MPs, outside the Catholic constituencies of Belfast Central and the Falls lost their seats to Unionists. Sine the CPNI did not have any seats to lose it could not suffer in the same way. Nonetheless, its campaign and resultant showing exposed the weakness of the strategy that is had followed since 1941.

Despite the Cold War, the CPNI's industrial base seemed secure. Such militants as Sinclair and Andrew Barr held their own by sheer superior efficiency against Unionist and Social Democratic rivals among the trade union leaders. In 1947 Sinclair was appointed Organiser to the Belfast Trades Council. Aided by the post-war renewal of the decline of the traditional Protestant-owned industries, which had played a major role in creating the circumstances for the division of the Belfast proletariat along religious lines, the Stalinite militants were still able to help strengthen class allegiances against those of the churches. Even the unemployment that was caused by the end of the wartime arms boom was used by them as a new opportunity for demonstrations – and one which was certainly less bloody than those of the reds and did force the British and Northern Irish Governments not to end unemployment but at least to stop it increasing too much.

What they could not do was to develop the advanced trade union consciousness of their comrades into the working-class political consciousness. In the Six County statelet this was impossible; the Protestants benefitted enough from the status quo to feel that they had no incentive to risk their actual benefits for only possible superior gain. Less rationally, those Protestants who did not benefit from this system supported it, if anything, more vehemently than its actual beneficiaries; if it went, they feared to lose even the formal chances they possessed.

The CPNI membership declined from over 1,000 to a few hundred. It had to discontinue publishing Unity. Whatever the possibilities of developing a working-class political consciousness beyond a small vanguard among the Northern Irish Protestant workers, the development of the Cold War doomed any such prospects. In 1945, the use of anti-Communist propaganda failed to stop the Communist candidates holding their deposits in the Northern Ireland constituencies wherein they stood. In 1949, such propaganda had been maintained throughout the capitalist world for nearly four years. Throughout the United Kingdom, the workers, although in places still ready enough to follow Communists for limited, industrial, ends, began to be more reserved about accepting their analysis for more general political questions.

Welfare capitalism seemed to be able to overcome finally the problems that had beset the workers between the wars. Even in Northern Ireland, where the unemployment rates remained the highest in the UK, the benefits cushioning the effects were recognisably different from those prevailing in the days of the Unemployed Movements. That those reforms were granted despite the Ulster Unionist MPs at Westminster did not deter their friends at Stormont from following a policy of parity 'step by step' with Britain in welfare measures. This policy was, of course, subsidised by the British Government (although on overall economic transactions, Britain probably, still, took more our of Northern Ireland than it put into it); 'Éire' did not get such subsidies and seemed, anyway, reluctant to move towards a 'Welfare State'. All this provided an extra argument for supporting the union – and, indeed, Unionism. In 1947 Midgely liquidated his Commonwealth Labour organisation into the Ulster Unionist Party – after a bitter campaign against Catholic schools, he re-entered the Northern Irish cabinet becoming Minister for Education – which he treated as a sinecurist backwater in which he ended his days.

Midgely's final betrayal led him beyond the point where the CPNI could still follow him. It was, after all, a Socialist Party. Further, the continued existence of a Comintern was not really necessary to explain the obvious fact that Unionism was no longer in any way an ally of the USSR. So the Party maintained its organisational integrity. This meant that it was caught by the negative aspect of the welfare state: its reinforcement of Cold War propaganda. Just an Unionism could and did point to the absence of adequate welfare services in 'Éire', so, too, it was able to join the capitalists of the world in denouncing the USSR – not for its lack of welfare services but for other weaknesses. For Soviet government was not at its most inspiring after twenty years of Stalin and with an economy that had to recover (in a way that Britain did not have to do) from an extremely bitter and destructive war of aggression that took place in its most industrialised areas. Comparison of this with the liberal Welfare State built on a stable economy subsidised from Colonial super-profits was totally confusing. Nonetheless, such comparisons were made day after day, week after week, by the organs of capitalist propaganda, in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere. The result was inevitable; in Britain, for example, since the general election of February 1950, no Communist MP has sat in the House of Commons.

The results of the Northern Irish general elections of February 1949, then, cannot be ascribed simply to the partition issue, but to the developments that had occurred to reinforce the effectiveness of that issue; the Welfare State and its Cold War with Soviet Russia (and 'Éire'). Although the NILP ascribe the losses of its seats to the border question and acted swiftly to establish its loyalty to the Union as being beyond doubt, it did not make any gains from this for nine years – until an election fought under the circumstances of a military and not merely a propaganda threat to partition.

That it was the Cold War as much as – or more than – the border issue that confounded the campaign of McCullough – the CPNI's sole candidate – in the Bloomfield division of Belfast can be seen by a cursory glance at its published details. Unlike in 1945, he was opposed not only by the Unionist Lord Glentoran but by a Labour candidate, Thomas Boyd. Between the three there was little to choose in their respective attitudes towards partition. Among other points, McCullough denounced the Unionists, alleging that they had plotted to break with Britain because of its Labour Government. He stated, also, that 'he could think of nothing better to rouse the entire working-class of Britain against Northern Ireland than a sweeping electoral triumph for Unionist reaction'. Northern Whig, 3 February 1949.

In the result, McCullough came a bad third with 623 votes; Boyd who came second, received two votes to his every one. Certainly, his vote had declined over the four years since 1945. But in the earlier fight he had had a straight fight with the Unionist.

Insofar as it is possible, comparison with British general election results support the view that McCullough's decline in support was a product of a general UK (itself an aspect of an international capitalist) trend. However, such a comparison is even more difficult for 1949-50 than it is for 1945. In the earlier case, the lapse between the two elections was one month; in the latter, though no qualitative change occurred, it was one year. More importantly, whereas in 1945 the CPNI fielded four candidates for three seats out of 28 contested compared with the CPGB's 20 out of 615, in 1949, the former ran McCullough in Bloomfield only, whereas, the next year, the CPGB nominated candidates for 100 seats out of 618. Obviously, when only one candidate runs, references to the average loses whatever relevance it had since an increased amount depends on the personality of the person involved. This factor will, indeed, be seen to be of crucial importance in this case.

All one can say is that, if one follows the procedure used in comparing the 1945 results to compare the results of the elections of 1949-50 and trebles McCullough's 1949 to put it on a par with the average vote of British Communist candidates in 1950, the figure reached – in his case 1,889 votes – is still just over twice that of the latter (918 votes). In 1949 McCullough polled 33% of the total anti-Unionist vote; in 1945 he had won it all. In the earlier election he and his comrades had polled on average roughly 2.5 times as well as their British comrades did the following month. So it would appear that, if judged by comparison with the British results, and taking into consideration the divided vote, he could be considered in the circumstances to have done better in the 1949 vote than in 1945: perhaps twice as well. Beyond this, we enter the realm of imponderables – such as the greater concentration of resources on the single constituency, the work done by the party there since 1945, and above all, by the fact that, as a candidate, McCullough was personally somewhat better than his opponents (his ability was recognised even by the Unionist Northern Whig).

In view of the continuing partitionist attitude of the CPNI in 1949 and the fact that the fall in its vote does not seem to have been qualitatively greater than the fall in its British comrades' votes the next year, one must agree with the Northern Whig in ascribing McCullough's humiliating defeat not at all to the border question – rather to the popular 'change of attitude' towards the USSR.

The result of this defeat merely made the CPNI more dependent on its existing support and less ready to go beyond the confines of purely industrial activism. This tendency was not helped by the events of the following April. Those both encouraged the Irish Stalinite organisations' differences on the border question and discouraged any serious attempt to resolve them one way or the other; quite in keeping with TA Jackson's strategy, in fact.

Firstly, on 4 April 1949, the majority of the capitalist powers of Europe signed the charter that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 'Éire' remained outside it, pleading it's differences with Britain concerning Northern Ireland. Such variegated right-wingers as the old Redmonite, John B Morgan, Michael Sheehy and other denounced this as failing capitalism in it's holy and spiritual struggle for private ownership of surplus value. Equally inevitably, the Communists of all persuasions considered Irish neutrality to be one thing in 'Éire''s favour. For Stalinists. this was more a cause for enthusiasm than it was for other Marxists. In the early 1960s, one of them, Roy Johnson, then an Irish emigrant in England, could still explain to his comrades in the South Hammersmith branch of the CPGB that 'judged by the criterion of attitude towards imperialism, Ireland has the most progressive government in Europe' (Outlook, January 1961, p.4). In more immediate, political, terms the fact that this 'attitude to imperialism' – negative as it was – could be considered 'progressive' – more precisely, that one Western European state was not prepared to go all the way in militarily opposing the USSR meant, once more, under the dogma of 'Socialism in One Country', that a Government following such as policy should not be too much embarrassed. The Irish Workers' League could not be too hostile or expose the capitalist provincial state in the Six Counties too much.

The USSR showed its own feelings a few weeks later when, on Easter Sunday, 24 April, 'Éire' left the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was felt by the Inter-Party Government not only that this might strengthen its claim to Northern Ireland but that it made 'Éire' more of a real Republic than before. At all events it replace the External Relations Act which recognised the King of England as responsible for diplomatic appointments. Britain replied by the Ireland Act which re-affirmed Northern Irish membership of the United Kingdom. The USSR, although it had never had diplomatic relations either with the First Dáils, the Saorstát or with 'Éire' was the first country to recognise the new situation. A further quarter of a century was to elapse before its act was reciprocated by a diplomatic exchange.

The Irish Workers' League reacted to the new situation by a Manifesto in May 1949. This declared, alongside other points:

'Ireland has always played her part in the great fight for freedom and democracy; she must not remain inactive now. Our country has yet to win its national unity and independence. By an Act of the British Parliament Ireland was partitioned. This action was not seriously opposed by the quisling section of Irish capitalism which then held and once again dominates the Government of the Twenty-Six counties. Six of our northern counties are held in military occupation, and the industries and resources of the area are directed to serve the british imperial interests. The country is burdened with the upkeep of two governments and the payment of imperial tribute and is prevented from developing a unified economy to serve the interests of all the irish people. The unity and independence of the country are an urgent necessity, not only for the solution of the pressing social and economic problems of the people, North and South, but also to safeguard the country as a whole from becoming involved in the war plans and intrigues of the Anglo-American imperialists. The situation demands a vigorous and consistent leadership on the part of the working-class movement in order to mobilise the working-people of Ireland to press the nation's claim against Britain and win social independence from both British imperialists and Irish capitalists.'

So, it appeared that the Irish Workers' League returned to the two-stage strategy of the Communist Party of Ireland as if nothing had happened in between times. Admittedly, now, the ending of partition played a larger role than it had done twelve years previously, but, even part from Jackson's teachings, it was logical that it should do so; it was the only demand remaining from the traditional list of claims for political self-determination.

But there are more important differences between the strategy that Irish Stalinism had followed in the 1930s and the strategy that was to follow in the 1950s. For, even bearing in mind the weakened nature of its organisation in the twenty-six counties, there were outside pressures that prevented a developed two-stage strategy getting beyond the sphere of propaganda. In the first place, there was the fact that 'judged by the criterion of attitude towards imperialism [read NATO] Ireland [had] the most progressive government in Europe' – and to hell with all the other criteria as far as the USSR was concerned. Reinforcing this was the fact that partition had established further vested interests in itself in the shape of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, whose fragile support would not look too kindly upon too determined opposition to the border.

So the IWL remained studiously vague about how partition was to be eliminated – apart from the call for 'a vigorous and consistent leadership on the part of the working-class movement' against it. In strict theory, of course, this was an improvement on the pre-war calls for 'Republican Congresses' and 'Republican-Labour Alliances' – let alone 'popular Fronts'. However, these sacred cows were killed off not for anything superior but in favour of a purely propagandistic and theoretical approach to the question of partition.

In particular, this meant that there was no serious attempt either to rival the Republican movement or to work with it. By now the IRA was beginning to revive after the hammering inflicted by Gerard Boland during the Emergency. It was working in close co-operation with Sinn Féin which was acting as the overall movement's political arm. However, it was, inevitably, confused and politically uncertain. Irish Communism could have made a direct political appeal to its potential membership. Less defensively it could have offered Sinn féin the hand of friendship in a 'Congress' or 'Front'. Both courses would have been uncertain in the prevailing Cold War atmosphere but would have had better results than what happened. As it was the reviving Republican movement fell into the hands of anti-political military strategists and religious zealots and tried to conquer Northern Ireland by purely military means unsupported by a mass organisation in the Republic. Meanwhile, Irish Stalinites remained aloof and concentrated on economic issues.

In the Fifties
Having made this criticism (and it one that must be made of other Irish Communists besides Stalin's followers); it can be said that in the fifties, the IWL and the CPNI did carry out useful work in economic agitation. Even politically they showed a basic minimum amount of leadership; the IWL organised opposition to British imperialism during the Korean War, braved clerical mobs to speak out at street corners. From 1950 they took the lead in celebrating May Day once again. After the Russian crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, its headquarters was physically attacked – and not by revolutionaries. Even in the economic sphere, they had to withstand similar reactionary prejudice manipulated more directly by capitalist interests. Joseph Deasy, a former Labour member of Dublin Corporation found that his attempt to organise a co-operative wholesale society at Inchicore and Ballyfermot was wrecked by the local alliance of priests and gombeenmen. But perhaps the Stalinites' greatest achievement in these years was their organising of the unemployed whose numbers grew as a result of the increasing crisis of 26 County protectionism. The highpoint of this (albeit a typical Stalinite one) was the unemployed protest committees campaign in South-Central Dublin in the general election of February 1957. Here, a politically inexperienced unemployed man, Jack Murphy, ran as representative of the unemployed and was elected – beating among others, the ex-Communist, RJ Connolly, now a Labour stalwart. This gave the movement a major impetus. But the very thoroughness of its success contained the cause of its defeat. Inevitably, Murphy found that the qualities that had got him into the Dáil were inadequate to oppose or even harass a firm overall Fianna Fáil majority. He could neither act as Dáil mouthpiece for or national leader of the movement. After one year, he resigned his seat in despair. The unemployed movement lost momentum by this incident and more lastingly by the modest decline in the unemployed rate provided by emigration and the admission of foreign imperialist firms to benefit from Irish cheap labour rates.

The Stalinites, then, led the economic struggles of the workers throughout more of the 1950s. O'Riordan established himself as the leader of the Dublin busmen in the ITGWU. Samuel Nolan played an important role in the unemployed organisation. None of this can or should be denied. The IWL was the political vanguard of the working-class struggles in the Republic of Ireland. Its onetime rival, the Trotskyist Revolutionary Socialist Party had been liquidated in 1950, partly because of internal splits; partly because it was felt that its remaining members should enter the Labour Party to get into a strong position in preparation for what was expected to be an immediate Third World War. As the Irish Labour Party at this time was in one of the shabbiest periods of its dingy career, the Trotskyists' decision benefited their Stalinite opponents. The Latter remained in incorruptible organisational purity and benefited from the disillusionment of left-wingers with Labour Party wheeler-dealing, as over the case of the Mother and Child Scheme[1]. The Trotskyists were absorbed, albeit reluctantly, into the party machine. The revival of their cause was to occur in another quarter.

In the fifties, then, Stalinism was the main ideology of the irish left. Its only serious opponent for the allegiance of potential revolutionaries was the Republican Movement – and this body alienated many of the more lively political minds by its crude contempt for politics and its concentration on pure physical force.

But Stalinism itself could not give adequate political leadership to the Irish workers – then or at any time. If the Republicans could be said to be obsessed with the border, the attitude of the IWL and the CPNI was no better. Their strategy involved de facto but unconditional recognition of it and this was expressed organisationally in their continuing separation as organisations. The cause of this attitude was the continuing 'progressive' nature of the Government of the Irish Republic and the continued dependence of the CPNI on its essentially industrial, economic influence over the Protestant workers of Belfast. However, behind this was the overall Stalinite methodology, with its emphasis on a disciplined rather than a politically-conscious organisation. This meant, in practice, that while members of the IWL and the CPNI stood bravely against the attacks of Orange and Catholic-clericalist mobs, politically, and more specifically, programmatically, as always, they were ready to water down their demands in an entirely opportunistic (if understandable) surrender to the political environment that produced such mobs.

This is particularly expressed in the Irish Workers' League Manifesto of September 1956, Emigration Can Be Ended. As its name implies, it was aimed as a reply to the rather inconclusive report of the Commission on Emigration in 1954. The League's counter-report includes many very pertinent points:

'The Commission itself was not representative enough of the working masses, who after all are the people most affected by emigration. Further, it failed to link adequately with Emigration the twin evil of Unemployment. Finally the Commission viewed the situation entirely within the perspective of a capitalist Ireland divided within both parts heavily fettered by British imperialism.' Emigration Can Be Ended, p.3.

'[The Commission] tried to visualise a solution of emigration without the present class basis of Irish society being disturbed.

'The abolition of emigration calls for a nation-wide movement in which a leading part would be played by a re-vitalised Labour Movement acting as an INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE and basing its programme and policy on the Socialist teachings of James Connolly.' Ibid, p.11.

In the end, however, it concludes with a characteristic retreat from Socialist perspectives:

'As long as the economy is run on capitalist lines there can be no final solution to our problems. The capitalists, of course, are not primarily concerned with solving the problems of emigration and unemployment. Their main concern is to make profit for themselves. Even under the present system, however, steps could be taken which could reduce the rate of unemployment and emigration and thus lay the basis for a complete solution of the problem.' Ibid, p.14.

The steps advocated involved a wide expansion of state powers and controls over what was envisaged as a continuing free enterprise capitalist economy. Even credit was to be controlled – rather than nationalised. This was considerably to the right even of the Labour Party programme of pre-Inter-Party days – though, of course, it appeared well to the left of what that party's leader, as Minister for Industry and Commerce was currently doing. It was less radical even than what the confused, and almost non-political Sinn Féin was advocating even then.[2]

As usual for Stalinites, the need had been formulated as being that of keeping the organisation together at any cost. The educative function of that organisation – most completely encapsulated in its programme – was sacrificed to the jobs of working more dedicatedly than anyone else at the tasks demanded subjectively by the workers. Since the political consciousness of the workers was still veering between Fianna Fáil, Labour, and in 1957, Independency and Abstention this replacement of political consciousness by unconscious activism could at best keep time for the IWL – just as surrender to Unionism was doing for the CPNI. The rate of emigration was reduced, in practice, by capitalist politics directly opposed to those proposed by the Irish Workers' League. No doubt they bear with them – and are already revealing – the seeds of equal and even greater economic crisis, but, as will be seen, this has had to be explained and the task of explaining was not lightened by the Stalinite method of relating the crisis to the necessity for their organisation, rather than to the need for Socialism.

So the 1940s and the 1950s revealed an overall downturn in the fortunes of Irish Stalinism. It was natural that this should have been so; the Cold War was particularly frigid in Ireland. The trouble was that Stalinism could only oppose to the imperialist offensive the dedication and courage of its militants – its ideology was, if anything, a handicap to them in their struggle. It encouraged its cadres both positively (as in its policy of purely propagandistic and formal – if even that – opposition to partition) and negatively (precisely because of its theoretical inadequacy) to surrender politically to the anti-Socialist pressures of the time, even as they fought those pressures determinedly as organisations. Their organisations survived those years to take part in the radicalisation of the sixties; this cannot be denied. Their rivals made more decisive organisational errors; that is true, too. However, the decisive charge is that Irish Stalinism's hard-won successes in riding out the Cold War was at the expense of deepening its errors of political analysis (and that of the vanguard of the irish working-class as a whole) and leaving it in a position where those errors could handicap the struggle when it was developing in an environment far more than previously favourable to the Irish workers and their allies.


[1] One of those who joined the Irish Workers' League as a reaction against Labour treachery over the matter was Justin Keating, then a student in the Science Department of Trinity College, Dublin, along with the League founder, Roy Johnston. A similar phenomenon would be seen in that quarter in the late 1960s, only that it would be Maoism, rather than mainline Stalinism that would attract the young scientist.

[2] It might be mentioned, too, that the pamphlet also contained the somewhat nationalist (and vaguely sexist) assertion that 'Emigration is a particularly bitter experience for a patriotic home-loving people like the Irish. Ibid, p.2. This was, however, only partly Stalinite original sin – insofar as it represented another political surrender to the general backwardness of the period.

 

 

 

 



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